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In the year that has passed since this article was originally
conceived, the cultural relevance of the mash-up has continued to
grow, rather than fade away as mere gimmickry. In a delicious slice of
irony, DJ Danger Mouse has been nominated for this year's Grammy
for Producer of the Year for his work with the Gorillaz - an album
released by EMI, the same company that silenced the Grey Album for
infringing upon the Beatles. This article aims to differentiate mashups from its two most frequent comparisons, digital sampling and
appropriation art. Finally, it analyzes the strength of their fair use
defense as a format legally equivalent to parody. Whether the
conclusion reached is disconcerting or comforting will largely be
determined by the reader's point of view.
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MASH-UPS AS A DERIVATIVE OF, AND DISTINGUISHED FROM,
SAMPLING

In order to make any sense of the legal issues surrounding the
mash-up, it is critical to agree on a basic etymology. Sampling refers
to a broad spectrum of musical techniques that involve taking some
portion of a preexisting sound recording and incorporating it into a
new sound recording.' Because of its amorphous definition, the roots
of sampling have been traced back to various points in time and
genres: from folk music; 2 to the post-World War II musique concrete
movement; 3 to Jamaican Dub music; 4 or to mid 70's proto-disco. 5 A

mash-up is a particular subset of sampling that "consist[s] of a vocal
track from one song digitally superimposed on the instrumental track
of another. . . ."6 "[The] hybrid tracks ... create new songs that are at
once familiar yet often startlingly different." 7 A mash-up as discussed
throughout the rest of this article is defined by the following elements:
(1) A new sound recording produced entirely of preexisting
sound recordings.
(2) Prior recordings must be presented such that they are
immediately recognizable to the listener. Authorship of the
prior recordings must be equally apparent.
(3) It must comment on or criticize the prior recordings.
The Grey Album had a pretty clear intent to comment on the
sound recordings of the Beatles and Jay-Z,8 but for other mashups it may be difficult to show.
(4) It should be offered for free, either through personal
websites, peer-to-peer file sharing applications, or traditional

1.

M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF Music 63

(Billboard Books 9th ed. 2003).
2.
See KEMBREW MCLEOD, OWNING CULTURE: AUTHORSHIP, OWNERSHIP AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 39 (2001).

3.
See generally Dennis Romero, Sample This!, CITY BEAT, Oct. 14, 2004, available
at http://www.lacitybeat.com/article.php?id=1302&ssueNum=71 (discussing the historical
origins of musical sampling).
4.
See Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that the
practice of sampling originated in Jamaica in the 1960's).
5.
Jeff Leeds, Mix and Mash, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2005, at 4.
6.
Pete Rojas, Bootleg Culture, Salon.com (Aug. 1, 2002), http://archive.salon.com/
tech/feature/2002/08/01/bootlegs (last visited Apr. 19, 2006).

7.

Id.

8.
Michael Paoletta, Danger Mouse Speaks Out On "Grey Album", BILLBOARD
(Mar. 8, 2004), availableat http://www.billboard.com/bb/daily/
article -display.jsp?vnu content id=1000455930. The recording consists of vocal tracks
from Jay-Z's "The Black Album" superimposed on beats taken from the Beatles' '"White
Album." Id.
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channels of bootleg culture. If a mash-up is going to be
commercially released, it needs to be cleared, because that
commercial intent would alter the fair use analysis.
The first case dealing with unlicensed sampling was Grand
Upright Music v. Warner Brothers Records.9 In an example of judicial
absolutism, the court invoked the Eighth Commandment as legal
precedent. 10 The court interpreted the fact that a clearance request
had been made and denied as conclusive proof that there was no
defense to Markie's use of the sample." The industry realized that by
establishing a system for clearing samples they could avoid future
litigation and cash in on catalogs that had been collecting dust for
decades. 12 Sampling became legitimate as long as one was willing,
and could afford to pay. The industry dogma continued to be that fair
use was never a defense to sampling, and the only defense available
13
was the rare taking that was not "substantial."'
Although not directly cited, Grand Upright's absolutist attitude
toward sampling as theft 4 was pervasive in the Sixth Circuit's
decision in Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, which rejects the
15
possibility of a de minimis defense for sampling sound recordings.
At the center of Bridgeport Music was an N.W.A. track titled "100
Miles and Runnin'," which used a two second sample that was so
edited, looped and distorted that it was unrecognizable to the
listener. 16 The court bluntly rejected a de minimis defense and set a
17
bright-line rule: "Get a license or do not sample."'
Bridgeport Music illustrates how the traditional concept of
sampling is inconsistent with mash-ups. Although it claimed to only
analyze the issue of de minimis taking, the court addressed the
propriety of the defendant's conduct. The court asserted that
producers sample only to "1) save costs, or 2) add something to the

9.

780 F.Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).

10.

Id. at 182 (opinion stating "thou shalt not steal," and footnoting to Exodus).

11.
12.

Id. at 184-85.
See Negativland, The Public Domain: Two Relationships to a Cultural Public

Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 239, 257 (2003) (explaining how the music industry

began charging purveyors for use of the music, once the industry realized that collaging
was here to stay).
13.
See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 1, at 96 (discussing the factors to be
considered in determining fair use).
14.
Judge Duffy took the theft metaphor so seriously that he referred the case to
the D.A. for consideration of criminal infringement charges. Grand Upright, 780 F.Supp. at
185.

15.
16.
17.

Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 399 (6th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 394.
Id. at 398.
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new recording, or 3) both."18
This reliance on pure economics
discounts any potential artistic or critical value in the selection and
execution of a sample. Mash-ups sample out of necessity, not for
parsimony or lack of creativity. The court claimed that the bright line
rule will not "stifl[e] creativity in any significant way," because "the
market will control the license price and keep it within bounds." 19
This free market theory crumbles when applied to a mash-up because
1) it is often impossible to get a license to create a derivative work that
is critical of the original; and 2) if a work will not be offered
commercially, nearly any license fee will serve as a bar to its creation.
In conclusion, BridgeportMusic expresses the current judicial position
on traditional sampling, but mash-ups cannot be viewed under that
paradigm, because they sample out of necessity, cannot exist under a
market theory and have a claim to comment or criticism.
II. MASH-UPS DIFFERENTIATED FROM APPROPRIATION ART
In comparing mash-ups to modern art, the most obvious
parallel is "appropriation art"20 and Jeff Koons, who lost two
infringement cases arising out of his 1998 "Banality Show."'2' The
exhibit "focused on popular attitudes towards objects and facts of
everyday life." 22 Koons's medium for expressing this theme was to
"accumulate images from popular culture by cutting out items that he
read or by purchasing objects during the course of his travels and then
23
're-contextualizing' these images into sculptures."
In Rogers v. Koons, Koons took a postcard by Art Rogers
depicting a couple holding eight puppies and created a sculpture
identical to the image. 24 Koons's justification for selecting the source
material was that it "[represented] part of the mass culture- -'resting
in the collective sub-conscious of people regardless of whether the card
had actually ever been seen by such people.' "25 Koons in no way
acknowledged Rogers as the author of the original work and physically
18.
19.

Id. at 399.
Id. at 398.

20.
Appropriation is "a term [which] refers to the more or less direct taking over
into a work of art of a real object or even an existing work of art." Tate Online, Glossary:
Appropriation, http://www.tate.org.uklcollections/glossary/definition.jsp?entryld=23
(last
visited Apr. 19, 2006).
21.
Rogers v. Koons, 960 F. 2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992); United Features Syndicated v.
Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
22.
United Features Syndicated, 817 F. Supp. at 372.

23.

Id.

24.
25.

Rogers, 960 F.2d at 304-05.
Id. at 305.
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removed the copyright notice on the postcard prior to sending it for
fabrication. 26 Similarly, in United Feature Syndicate, Koons created a
sculpture from an image of Odie, the canine foil to Garfield the cat in a
long running comic strip. 27 Koons claimed that he was not aware of
the identity of the image when he selected it, and that "[i]f [he]
thought that there would have been a strong public reaction to the
Puppy as 'Odie' [he] would not have selected it for the piece." 28 The
court relied on this evidence to conclude that the goal of the piece was
in no way related to the selection of the particular images and
therefore could not receive the greater protection afforded parodies. 29
Mash-ups are significantly different from the works in the
Koons cases in ways that better align with fair use. First, where
Koons's targets for commentary are broad and social in scope, more
akin to satire, 30 mash-ups have direct targets, similar to parody. Also,
Koons was primarily interested in the underlying ideas instead of one
particular expression of those ideas, 31 but for a mash-up, the
expression is inextricably intertwined with the idea.
Koons
appropriated with the intent to make the underlying works
anonymous and claim them as his own, 32 whereas mash-ups do the
exact opposite. In order for a mash-up to be effective, the listener
must immediately recognize the underlying works and not associate
33
those earlier works with the mash-up producer.
In conclusion, Koons did not appropriate in a way that
commented on the expression itself, and therefore could not bring his
work under the umbrella of parody. Furthermore, Koons's decision to
remove the copyright notice made his conduct improper under fair use.
Conversely, mash-ups directly target the works that they appropriate
and give proper attribution.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 305, 309.
United Features Syndicated, 817 F. Supp. at 373.
Id. at 384 (quoting Koons Aft. 1 19).
Id.
Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310.
Id. at 308.
Id. at 305.
Rojas, supra note 6, at 2.

VANDERBILTJ. OFENTERTAINMENTAND TECH. LAW

536

[Vol. 8:3:531

III. FAIR USE ANALYSIS
A. Preamble to Section 107: Mash-ups as a Type of Comment or
Criticism that Should be Analyzed as "quasi-parody"
The preamble to Section 107 of the Copyright Act lists several
types of fair use, including criticism or commentary. 34 This list is
merely illustrative, and not exclusive.3 5 Notably, parody does not
appear in the list. Rather, parody is a subset of criticism that requires
a more liberal analysis. 36 For a parody to bring a targeted work
within the crosshairs of criticism, the author is allowed to mimic the
original. 37 Satire, on the other hand, has not been extended this extra
protection, because it is making a comment, not about the original
work, but instead is using that work to comment on a larger social
issue.3 8 Under the rubric of comment or criticism, mash-ups should be
analyzed as a "quasi-parody" expression, because they share the
necessity of using a preexisting work for the purpose of commenting
on that work.
Kane v. Comedy Partners39 is one example of a court adopting
this post-modern view of criticism that expands the protection given
parodies to other formats. Sandra Kane was the host of a public access
TV show. 40 The Daily Show, a "fake news program" on Comedy
Central, aired an unlicensed clip from her show as a part of a segment
called "Public Excess," which was a collection of snippets of poor
quality public access programs followed by some sly remarks. 41 The
court recognized that this was not a traditional parody, because it "did
not involve an altered imitation of a famous work in a mocking
context."

42

However, the court decided to apply the standards of parody,
because "[t]he only significance of deeming a work a parody is the
concomitant determination that the work contains elements of
commentary and criticism .... '[T]he heart of any parodist's claim to
quote from existing material, is the use of some elements of a prior
34.

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).

35.
36.

Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 (11th Cir. 1984).
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 580-81 (1994).

37.
38.
39.
(S.D.N.Y.
40.
41,
42.

Id.
Id. at 581.
Kane v. Comedy Partners, No. 00 Civ. 158 (GBD), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18513
Oct. 16, 2003), aff'd, 98 Fed. Appx. 73 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 10.
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author's composition to create a new one that, at least in part,
comments on that author's workf.' "43 In the same way that the
constraints of The Daily Show format necessitated a wholesale taking
of a fragmented part of Kane's program in order to make its
commentary, the limits of a mash-up allow it to claim that copying is
necessary to achieve the desired type of criticism. Therefore, when
analyzing the fair use factors, the parody line of cases should be
applied to mash-ups, despite the fact that they do not strictly meet the
definition of parody.
B. Purpose and Characterof Use
The first factor listed in § 107 is "the purpose and character of
the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes. '44 Analyzing this factor requires
three considerations: whether the use was transformative or merely
superseded the market for the original, 45 whether the use was
46
commercial in nature and the propriety of the defendant's conduct.
The more transformative the use is, the less likely it will be to
supersede the market for the original, and therefore the more
protection it deserves.47 Most musical parodies involve the alteration
of lyrics, but not the melody. 48 A mash-up producer could argue that
both works are being transformed simultaneously, in the same
manner of a traditional parody. One work alters the lyrics while
keeping the melody, and the other alters the melody while keeping the
lyrics.
Therefore, mash-ups have at least an equal claim of
transformative use as a parody.
There are two arguments that favor mash-ups under the
commerciality analysis. First, because they are primarily offered free
on the Internet, mash-ups could claim to be a non-commercial use.
Several cases have found a commercial use when the infringing works
were being offered as free downloads to the public. 49 Mash-ups are
transformative uses and therefore are unlike the facts in Sega,
Napster and Mp3.com, where the infringing works were identical to
43.
Id. at 11 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580).
44.
17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000).
45.
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
46.
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
47.
Abilene Music v. Sony Music Entr't, 320 F. Supp. 2d. 84, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
48.
See e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569; Abilene, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 84; Fisher v.
Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).
49.
See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679, 687 (N.D. Cal. 1994); A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001); UMG Recordings, Inc.,
v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d. 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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the originals and their only claim to transformation was changing the
channel of delivery.
Second, if mash-ups were considered a
commercial use, then some mitigation should be available, because the
defendant makes only an indirect profit from increased notoriety that
may lead to later employment.
The final consideration under this factor is the propriety of the
defendant's conduct. The prevailing industry attitude is that since
mash-ups circumvent the well-established licensing system, they are
improper. However, this fails to recognize that mash-ups cannot
conform to the industry model. Many artists will not license new
works that are critical or that recontextualize their old works in a
manner they find offensive. 50 The time and costs associated with
clearing samples can also serve as an absolute bar to the creation of
mash-ups. 5 1
However, some courts have acknowledged the
conundrum of asking permission to criticize another person's work
and have held that releasing a parody after being denied permission is
not bad faith. 52 In conclusion, the three considerations under this first
factor weigh in favor of mash-ups.
C. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second factor in § 107 is "the nature of the copyrighted
work." 53 Generally, creative works are given greater protection from
fair uses than factual works, because they are viewed as being part of
"the core of intended copyright protection."5 4 For parodies, however,
the Supreme Court has said that this second factor is nearly
irrelevant, because "parodies almost invariably copy publicly known,
expressive works. ' 55 This equally applies to mash-ups, therefore, the
second factor should only slightly favor a finding against fair use. 56
D. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
When analyzing this factor, parodies are given greater leeway,
in the form of the "conjure up" test, in both the quantity and quality of
50.
Negativland, supra note 12, at 275 ("Allowing source owners to have control
over [collages] through payment and permission requirements also prevents collagists from
using a clip ... in a critical or unflattering context which the clip's owner doesn't happen to
appreciate and thus refuses to allow.").
51.
Id.; MCLEOD, supra note 2, at 91-96.
52.
See, e.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986).

53.

17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2000).

54.
55.
56.

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
Id.
See Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mt. Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 803 (9th Cir. 2003).
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the amount taken, because it is a necessity if parodies are going to be
tolerated. 57 The "conjure up" test sets a minimum barrier, and a
parody could still fail under this factor if it takes a greater amount
than is necessary to recall the original. 58 There are three factors for
determining when a parody has exceeded its necessary taking: "the
degree of public recognition of the original work, the ease of conjuring
up the original work in the chosen medium, and the focus of the
parody." 59 Mash-ups share the necessity to conjure up preexisting
works. The underlying works in mash-ups are always well known to
the average listener, and there is no other way to conjure a sound
recording for criticism other than appropriating that sound recording.
Therefore, if courts apply the "conjure up" test to mash-ups, this factor
will not weigh against fair use.
E. Effect on PotentialMarket Value
Courts generally give this factor the greatest weight,60 and the
market for licensing samples is one potential market considered. 6 1 As
discussed previously, a sample is utilized in a fundamentally different
way from mash-ups and because of the different nature of the use they
should not reduce the market for licensed samples. The stronger
argument is that unlicensed mash-ups will destroy the market for
licensed mash-ups. Two songs are involved in every mash-up, so this
argument would be valid only insofar as that particular combination
of songs is concerned. But this bootleg mash-up of song A with song B
should have no effect on the potential market to license song A with
song X or song B with song Y. The deleterious effect on the market for
licenses of samples and mash-ups under this factor reaches a level
barely above de minimis.
IV. CONCLUSION

As evidenced by the popularity of the Grey Album, society is
willing to accept this new genre as a type of legitimate, creative work,
and courts will be forced to deal with the copyright issues raised by
mash-ups as long as records labels attempt to silence them. Fair use
may provide a defense for mash-ups if courts are willing to
57.
mind, the
58.
59.
60.
61.

Fisher, 794 F.2d at 434 ("To 'conjure up' the original work in the audience's
parodist must appropriate a substantial enough portion to evoke recognition.").
Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F. 2d. 751, 757 (9th Cir. 1978).
Fisher,794 F.2d at 438.
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
Id. at 569.
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acknowledge that the genre shares the core elements of parody and
apply that line of cases. Mash-ups are transformative uses that do not
supplant the market for the original, nor do they harm the market for
traditional sample licenses. Like parodies, they must be allowed to
use parts of preexisting works to "conjure up" the originals in the
listener in order to be created. To quell this new form of cultural
feedback would disserve the constitutional goal of copyright by
restricting the public's access to free works that do not economically
injure the original authors.

